Turkey in the New Iraqi Stage

Turkey's share in Iraqi politics and its economy may be greater than that of any other country in the region. The two states have long joint borders extending for more than 310km. Turkey is Iraq's shortest land route to Europe, whereas Iraq is the shortest and lowest-cost route for Turkey's commercial and economic activities with the Gulf States. Moreover, the pipeline, through which the crude oil of Kirkuk reaches the Turkish Ceyhan seaport, has remained for the two past decades the most important trade artery for the two countries. In addition, many people expect that the economic, political and military partnership between the two countries in the future will pave the way for the emergence of a strong strategic base in the Middle East against terrorism.

To say nothing of Turkey's major participation in the reconstruction of Iraq. But the main stumbling block is that Turkey is slow to act in the direction of Iraq and has shown an unjustified sensitivity toward the country and the Middle East, compared to its fast steps in the direction of Europe and the EU. In Iraq's case, it has made the implicit condition that it should play a political role in the country before there can be any economic, trade and diplomatic co-operation. It has also made a stipulation concerning its vague concept of the integrity of the Iraqi state. Turkey repeated its calls on the Iraqi Kurds, the Iraqis and the Americans to co-operate to eliminate the remnants affiliated to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) on its borders with Iran. But it forgets that this step requires first and foremost a complete suspension of Turkey's military incursions in Iraq's Kurdistan and that it should refrain from shelling the Kurdish villages located close to its borders in the Zakhu area.

Above all, the matter requires the complete political and economic normalization of relations with the Iraqi Kurds. Turkey is making a mistake if it thinks that normalizing relations with the Kurds will be at the expense of Baghdad. The Kurds are no longer represented in Iraq as an abstract case of nationality. Throughout the last three years, they have asserted that they are the strongest and most crucial guarantee for the preservation of Iraq's integrity and for bringing together the viewpoints of its different ethnic formations.

The most glaring evidence of this was the efforts of the Kurdish leaders, particularly the president of the Kurdistan region, Massoud Barazani, to bring the viewpoints of the Iraqi ethnic formations closer together and stop the wave of violence in Iraq.

On the other hand, Ankara stresses the issue of the Turkmen minority in Iraq, and signaled that Kirkuk should remain outside a Kurdish federation. Notwithstanding, it seems that Ankara did not learn from its bitter experience in Cyprus, when it intervened to uphold the interests of the Turkish minority. It harmed this minority instead of benefiting it. In this light, Turkey has the right to stress the importance of preserving the rights of minorities in Iraq, including those of the Turkmen.

Turkey should know that the Turkmen problem, assuming that it exists, is an Iraqi problem through and through, and any talk about the status of the Turkmen in Iraq may lead to a rejoinder from Baghdad and Irbil about the conditions of the Turkmen, Arabs, Alawites and Armenians in Turkey. Ankara must also give up the idea of searching for solutions for the future of the oil-rich Kirkuk, since the permanent Iraqi constitution approved by the people late last year stipulates that an Iraqi solution should be reached on the subject.

Weeks ago, the government of Nouri al-Malki decided to activate the committee, which has not more than a year to normalize the situation within the government. Any Turkish, Iranian or American intervention in this regard will be detrimental to the Iraqis' decision to solve their problems on the basis of the law and the constitution.

On the other hand, it may be said that the Turks no longer have reservations about a Kurdish Federation in Iraq. But, surely, they still have reservations in principle about a federal Iraq, in the belief that if a centralized government loses its grip, the disintegration of the Iraqi state will follow, and this could open the way for Iranian and Syrian intervention.

Furthermore, in this regard, Ankara ignores a basic fact: Turkey itself may have to opt for federalism, especially if its negotiations with Brussels lead to its accession to the EU, which stresses on decentralizing the political, economic and cultural life of the member states.

Likewise, Ankara continues to cling to the erroneous belief that the PKK problem is not purely Turkish, but a result of the complications of the political situation in the neighboring countries, especially Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan.

What aggravates the problem is that this mistake leads to others in Turkish influential circles, such as the army. Among these mistakes is the belief that the solution to the PKK problem does not lie with Turkey, but inside Iraq; and that the solution is not to achieve the pacifist and cultural demands of Turkey's Kurds, but to force Iraqi Kurds to fight the PKK.

In the same context, over the past three years, and especially after the demise of the former Iraqi regime, Turkey has formed another wrong idea. It has been trying to persuade the US to co-operate with it to launch joint military operations against the PKK fighters inside Iraqi Kurdish territories.

What has led Ankara to this belief is that Washington has put the party's name on the list of terrorist organizations. But Ankara did not take into consideration the fact that the party has been always looking forward to normalizing relations with the US. The Americans, for their part, did not hesitate to contact some PKK officials to encourage them to renounce violence and pursue peaceful methods. The Kurds know that Washington enlisted the party's name as the result of growing Turkish insistence.

The Americans do not want to open a new front, this time with the PKK in the North, when their forces are facing prickly military problems in central and southern Iraq. The US is unlikely to encourage the Iraqi federal government and the Kurdish regional government to extend the clashes to the stable Kurdish areas. However, if the aim is to stop infiltration across the border, the Americans are well aware that the infiltration does not occur through Iraqi territories, but through the borders of neighboring states, such as Turkey. The acts of terrorism, violence and extremism that Turkish cities are experiencing are not the result of infiltrations. They are the result of the obvious presence of PKK fighters in Turkey. If we suppose that the pockets of PKK fighters have a logistic role in this violence, the solution surely will not be to trigger new fighting across the border. The solution is to implement a political program that includes pardoning these fighters and eliminating poverty in Turkish Kurdistan. It should also include satisfying the cultural and political demands of the Kurds in eastern Turkey.

Meanwhile, the US, which was greatly disappointed by Ankara's decision not to take part in the Iraq war in 2003, may face difficulties in convincing the American people of the feasibility of siding with Turkey in an unjust war against an unarmed people. The Americans will definitely respond to any Turkish official request of assistance in the war against Kurdish terrorism by saying that the real and serious terrorism lies in Iraq. They will try to convince the Turkish officials that they must help the Iraqis face this terrorism, which may spread in the region if it meets with success.

Ankara needs to normalize its relations with Iraq. This will happen by the exchange of high-level political visits. Turkey should also stop interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq. It should accept the fact that Iraqi Kurdistan is not a thorn in the side of Iraq. Rather, it is the real commercial, economic and political gateway to the new Iraq. Many questions may be asked in this connection: will Turkey be able to begin a new stage of strategic relations with Iraq? Will this new stage begin with a visit by Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul to Irbil, the capital city of Iraqi Kurdistan, and then to Baghdad, the federal capital of Iraq? Let us wait and see.

Sami Shorosh

Source: Al-Hayat