
After the Taliban's successful spring offensive there are calls from
Kabul for reconciliation with them, indications from the US and recognition of
the fact from Pakistan that without striking a major deal with the Taliban,
there can be no peace and stability in Afghanistan.
The Taliban, though, forced out of power by the US-led invasion of 2001
for harboring Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, are already planning for next
year's offensive, the central aim of which is to retake Kandahar, their
previous spiritual capital.
Afghans know their traditions well and are aware that the current
insurgency has the ability to turn into a mass rebellion against foreign
forces, but most people do not know exactly how this will happen.
Asia Times Online traveled deep inside Taliban territory to get some
answers.
Huge swaths of the Pashtun heartland in southwestern Afghanistan are now sympathetic to the
Taliban-led resistance against foreign troops and the Hamid Karzai-led
administration in Kabul.
The Taliban have strongholds in most villages and they prove their presence
through daily attacks. More than 4,000 people, mostly civilians, are believed
to have died in fighting this year, including more than 100 foreign soldiers.
The soul of the southwest is the town of Kandahar, in the province of the same name.
All surrounding districts are highly volatile, especially the Panjwai area, the
strategic center of the Taliban near Kandahar.
There have only been a few isolated attacks in Kandahar itself, and
driving through the city it appears to be very much a stronghold of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO vehicles are everywhere, and when they pass
through the main arteries they occupy both lanes to cut off potential suicide
vehicles. Taxi drivers and private motorists immediately pull off the road when
they see NATO vehicles approaching.
All major roads and intersections are manned by Afghan police and the
Afghan National Army. On the surface, Kabul appears to be in full control of Kandahar
and its administration under no threat.
Appearances can be deceptive, though.
A son of the soil
Abdul Jalil lives in a middle-class neighborhood of Kandahar, although
he is regarded as a true son of the soil. He was a middle-ranking official
during the Taliban regime of 1996-2001.
After the fall of Kandahar he chose to lie low; when he did visit his
family he did so in secret. Over time he started to move around Kandahar more
openly, but always declined any renewed association with the Taliban. In the
past few months, though, the situation changed dramatically.
"We used to avoid visiting public places. We were afraid of
speaking in favor of the Taliban. Now you can see I move all around. I go to
the marketplaces and openly introduce myself as a Talib," Abdul Jalil told
Asia Times Online at his home, where several other Taliban also live.
But these men are not fighters. They have been assigned by the Taliban's
command center in Panjwai district to provide logistical support.
For obvious reasons, Abdul Jalil was not prepared to go into too much
detail about precise Taliban activities. But what can be gleaned is that
hundreds of others in Kandahar like Abdul Jalil have been drawn back into the
ranks of the Taliban.
The main reason for this is the change in mood in the Pashtun areas,
from being ambivalent - if not even hostile - toward the Taliban, to fully
supporting them.
Almost all the tribes of the Pashtun heartland of Kandahar, Helmand and
Uruzgan provinces, the traditional rulers of modern Afghanistan since the 18th
century, feel that they are now politically deprived and that the occupying
forces do not trust them.
Repeated aerial bombings of civilians have also played right into the
Taliban's hands and ordinary people, tired of being innocent targets over the
years, now welcome the Taliban's foot soldiers.
Thus people like Abdul Jalil, who had been prepared to abandon the
Taliban, are once again active in the movement.
Two of Abdul Jalil's house guests were Mehmood and Hamid, both in their
late 20s, about the same age as their host, who appeared to be senior to them
in matters related to the Taliban. All three were educated in Kandahar
madrassas (seminaries) and, from their appearance, were obviously clerics.
Mehmood and Hamid had been assigned to collect donations from Afghan
philanthropists, traders and businessmen and arrange money, satellite-telephone
pre-paid cards, blankets, clothes and food for Taliban fighters in various
districts around Kandahar and Panjwai.
"Brother, the situation has changed now," said Mehmood.
"We go out and ask for contributions for the resistance and come back with
our pockets full of money and resources. Some traders have taken on the
responsibility of recharging credit in satellite phones and they supply prepaid
cards worth Rs3,000 US every month. Others purchase blankets and jackets,
vegetables, meat and flour, and some contribute cash. We supply all this to
different fronts."
Hamid and Mehmood pointed out that the restoration of these networks had
made the Taliban much more effective, organized and in good morale.
The bigger picture
Abdul Jalil is also associated with the Taliban's logistics, but his
responsibilities are more tactical in that he is helping prepare for next
year's primary objective, the capture of Kandahar, and then in mobilizing all
major forces in southwestern Afghanistan to unseat the Kabul government.
For this, Abdul Jalil is well suited. He is trained in guerrilla urban
warfare, especially in the use of improvised explosive devices, a skill he
learned in Pakistan's North Waziristan tribal area.
Abdul Jalil's multiple roles include coordinating between the Taliban
and those government officials who are sympathetic to the resistance. He
relates how, when he has to travel in high-risk areas, a friendly, highly
placed government official from Kandahar takes him in his jeep - complete with
official license plates. He adds that much of the material he sources comes
from the government.
Commenting on the Taliban's tactics, he said, "We follow the
techniques of remote-controlled explosive devices used by the
Iraqi resistance. But our technology is different. The Iraqis improvise
with various explosive materials and then link it to a remote control.
"Our source of explosives is anti-personal and anti-tank mines.
These were in the possession of various warlords who looted them after the fall
of the communist government in Kabul early 1990s. They either sold or donated
the mines to us," said Abdul Jalil.
"These mines are our main source and we link them with remote
controls and effectively blow up our targets. But this is not the only source -
the other source is American bombs.
"Many of the bombs they drop from the air do not explode. I am an
expert in defusing these unexploded bombs, and there are many others like me.
We extract all the explosives inside the bomb shells and use them for sacrifice
suicide attacks," said Abdul Jalil.
Over endless cups of tea, Abdul Jalil, Mehmood and Hamid discussed the
various colors of the Taliban-led resistance.
"The Taliban will be ready to mobilize next summer, but the lead
role will be played by local tribes and pro-government warlords. All tribes,
including the one Hamid Karzai belongs to Durrani, do not support the Kabul
government. The Taliban will be a leader, but the main engine will be
dissatisfied tribes and warlords," said Abdul Jalil.
The three men stressed that during the winter lull in fighting, the
Taliban would focus on establishing better coordination among their rank and
file and in improving their links in the government. Secret arms dumps would
also be restocked.
On the road again
Along with colleague Qamar Yousufzai, we planned to travel to Musa
Killa, where, after a prolonged fight and siege by the Taliban, British forces
evacuated the area and handed over control to tribal elders.
Abdul Jalil pointed out that the two of us should not travel alone in a
taxi. While this correspondent could pass for an Afghan, Qamar looked
Pakistani. We therefore decided to share a taxi with several other people.
As soon as we left Kandahar, the driver began playing a cassette tape of
Pashtu music. Immediately one of the passengers objected, and demanded that the
tape be ejected and his played instead. So we then traveled along to the sounds
of Taliban jihadist songs (but with no music) condemning the United States in
particular and the West in general.
This was followed by a tape extolling the Prophet Mohammed and attacking
cartoons published in the West that ridiculed him. The singer vowed that
revenge would be taken by defeating the Americans in Afghanistan.
On the way to Helmand province we passed through several official
checkpoints, but the Afghan police didn't check anything, only demanding that
the driver pay 10 Pakistani rupees.
"This is not an octroi toll. This is pure extortion by the police
and we pay because we do not have any option," the driver muttered. The
Afghan police do not have a good reputation among the masses. They are
notorious for being involved in extortion, and they love to shake down
strangers. They are not beyond kidnapping, and even assassination.
As the taxi approached the district of Gerishk and the last police
checkpoint before Taliban country, the passenger who had supplied the tapes
asked with a smile, "Now tell me, who are you are and why you are going to
Musa Killa?"
"I am a journalist and want to see how the Taliban manage their
areas and how they operate," I told him, fully aware that he must be
Taliban.
"Oh, a journalist ... you mean the people who play with danger.
Meet me, I also play the same game," he said with a laugh but without
providing his name.
But he was not joking. He turned out to be part of the Taliban structure
in Helmand coordinating activities between Taliban strongholds in the province
and Taliban pockets in Kandahar city.
The Taliban in Helmand are expected to play a central role in the
planned fall of Kandahar. Many top field commanders are already concentrated
there and Taliban leader Mullah Omar is expected to spend some time in the
province making formal tribal arrangements that will unify all tribes under one
pro-Taliban flag.
Source: Atimes
By Syed Saleem Shahzad